The points presented here are historically based. They are drawn from recorded history and eyewitness accounts. Disputes can be verified or referred to the author and relevant references will be provided. For constraints of length references are not included here.
There are no compelling historical reasons why the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland chose to acquire the political entity of Nigeria comprising; the Colony of Lagos, the Protectorate of Nigeria and the Trust Territory of the Cameroons (Northern and Southern). For argument’s sake, can we put this down to “Another’s Choice?”. Fast forward to today, in the context of the current embarrassment, christened the “Cameroon Anglophone Crisis; there are sufficient historical records to argue that, while another’s choice could have “made us”, our own governance processes brought us here.
Southern Cameroons identity: we neither chose the “where”, the “appartenance”, nor the “name”: they were others’ choices;
It is on record that, the Portuguese christened this choice territory “Camarões” in 1472 upon encountering “shrimps” in the river Wouri, and 386 years later in 1858, Alfred Saker, the British Missionary landed further north at Victoria with 200 freed slaves, thereby initiating British presence in the territory. Shrimps in German is “Garnelen”, bearing no resemblance to “Camarões”, so when the Germans signed the Treaty with Douala Chiefs in 1884, they maintained the Portuguese christening, later adopted by the French – Cameroun, and by the British – Cameroons (referring to Northern and Southern). Transitioning from Portuguese to German has been based on decision choices by others; we the Africans had no part in this.
Social sensitivity, human development or cohesion for us Africans did not also appear to have been a priority during German occupation, as draconian treatment of the African royalty was to demonstrate. Chief Rudolf Douala Manga Bell and his secretary, Adolf Ngosso Din were brutally hung until they were dead in August 8th 1914. This, for legitimately protesting the institution of Apartheid through native lands appropriation and creation of a 1 km separation zone between German residents and the locals. Following the ensuing unrests, German headquarters were temporarily moved to Buea in 1902.
As footnote here; while his father was being murdered in the name of Kaiser at home, for standing up for native rights, Alexander Ndumbe Douala Manga Bell, was fighting on the German Side of World War 1.
If Germany could treat the party which signed-over the territory to them so callously, politico-social harmony, identity or cohesion in the territories, let alone a possible future for the natives, as a Nation could never have been on their minds, or relevant to their choices.
So, when Britain later carved-out Southern and Northern Cameroons from the spoils of War to add to huge Nigeria, their apparent insensitivity to “politico-social cohesion” can be understood – because none could have existed beyond our racial, African brotherhood stretching eastwards into Tchad and RCA, westwards into Nigeria and southwards into Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.
This did not mean that, like the Douala, there was no sense of strong local, socio-cultural cohesion between communities – there were. In fact, strong socio-cultural and tribal links exist to this day with all neighboring countries.
For instance, the Plebiscite results of 11th February 1961 showed clear wins for “Independence with Nigeria” in Nkambe Division (Today’s Ndonga Mantung Division) and for Kumba North (Today’s Meme and Ndian Divisions). Historical records attest to how the interpretations of the Plebiscite were contested in April of 1961 at the UNO for interpretations of the results on local cultural lines and affinities.
Big self-funded delegations of the Molongo (Bakweris), Mokanya (Orokos) and the Muane-Ngoh (Bakossi) and Nkambe were dispatched to New York to make the case for respect of local socio-cultural peculiarities, and their expression during the choice of “where to achieve independence”. The foundation argument was that, Plebiscite results, unlike elections can last a thousand years, with no room for a re-think. Therefore, where populations wish to invest their futures and destinies of their forebears; born and unborn to either Independent Cameroun or Nigeria, such choice had to be respected.
On the other side, and opposing these submissions by the Molongo, Mokanya and Muane-Ngoh, were Premier Foncha - Southern Cameroons, ST Muna, the British Delegation, One Kamerun of Ndeh Ntumazah, UPC, and a powerful Delegation from the then Independent Republic of Cameroon (RC) led by – Dr Eyidi Bebe (Resource Person) and the Hon Charles Okala (Foreign Minister -RC).
So, against the Resolution from the Trusteeship Council, recommending to the General Assembly to endorse the results of the 1961 Plebiscite of Southern Cameroons, the results showed; Yes – 26, No – 6 and Abstentions – 33. Charles Okala’s Republic of Cameroon and some Francophonie countries abstained. This was because, according to the results, although Southern Cameroons was joining Republic of Cameroon, Northern Cameroons had decided to achieve Independence by joining Nigeria – The Hon Charles Okala wanted both Cameroons.
Cameroonians of La Republique, Southern and Northern Cameroons chose neither “Camarões”, Kamerun, Cameroun, nor Cameroon. Southern Cameroonians as a whole however, chose reunification with La Republique du Cameroun, through the Plebiscite of 11th February 1961. The Southern Cameroons leaders in government were also the main actors in the governance process, pre and after the Foumban Accords, shaping the Cameroon of today.
Governance of our politics and of reunification: why we must accept responsibility for slip-ups, and fix them responsibly.
For those seeking the truth and answers, an authentic pathway exists towards understanding the roots of the current crisis; one littered with personality clashes and feuds, falsehood, exclusion, red flags and regret
1953 – The S. Cameroons bloc of 13 representatives declares “Benevolent Neutrality” in Nigerian Politics, weakens the NCNC of Nnamdi Azikiwe and alienates the pro-Southern Cameroon’s political base.
1954 – 1958: During Endeley’s KNC Premiership, the KPP remained a fierce opponent; helped to weaken the KNC, making Endeley vulnerable, although these two would be forming a coalition later at a most crucial time. Could they have done better with less acrimony?
1959 – 1961 - KNDP is formed by Foncha and Jua, weakens KNC further as KPP/KNDP now focusses on the KNC in Government; the Endeley-Galega falsehood drives a wedge between KNC and KNDP & between some north westerners and south westerners; Women’s vote comes; pro-Nigeria accusations erupts against KNC/KPP; pro-KNDP intrigues of the nebulous “Cameroon Society” gains grounds, e.g., Famous letter to sell “Southern Cameroons” to Igbos spreads anti KNC, especially anti KPP sentiments; pro- “reunification” actions and operatives of OK, UPC, and La Republique du Cameroun are intensified; 1960 – Second Thoughts on plebiscite arises; and London Conference to postpone Plebiscite comes, in vain; and the PM Foncha drops the “Dowry” embarrassment.
1961 – Plebiscite (votes: 233,571 for re-unification; 97,741 against). KPP/KNC delegation goes to the UNO and contests results. Told to return and make reunification work. Bamenda/Mankon pre-Foumban consultations held; Yaoundé’s proposal for constitution is not shared by Southern Cameroons Premier. Southern Cameroons leaders go to Foumban unprepared; Conference is rushed and many reunification Accords are postponed to committees later-on. Now Ahidjo has power over Buea parliament. Although Buea parliament is 50:50 KNDP: CPNC, the KNDP goes it alone during 9 months of Provisional Arrangements and afterwards appoints ONLY KNDP Men and Women to all shared positions in the Civil Service, Diplomatic Services, etc., leaving out KNC/KPP with 50% of representatives in Buea completely out!
1965 - 1972 - Jua forms shaky coalition Government with “opposition”; Ahidjo uses powers over Buea to replace Jua with Muna as PM, although latter (Muna) was not an elected Representative – a red flag for things to come? No Political action from Buea.
It is said that, such was the hatred between some of the Men in Buea, the KNDP leadership would have swallowed every and anything, except involve/harken to the leadership of KNC/KPP in any decision, although the latter (KNC/KPP) coalition held 50% of the seats in Buea! The Federal Republic ended on 20th May 1972 and as wilderness years begins for KNC/KPP Men and women, the KNDP and its Cohorts Head to Yaoundé and the "good life".
1990 – The Social Democratic Party of Nih John Fru Ndi is launched; the aftermath of strikes, social unrest raises second thoughts about our party politics credentials. Presidential Elections controversy erupts in 1992.
1993 – “All Anglophone Conferences I and II lay bare new rumblings of “Anglophone discontentment”
1995 – “Southern Cameroons National Conference” SCNC Delegation – mainly Former KNDP leaders and “Cameroon Society” Operatives (Muna, Foncha, Barrister Elad, Dr Munzu, Mr Njoh Litumbe, Justice ANT Mbu travel to New York, and talk of return to Federalism and or “Separation” becomes thick in the air.
2016 – “Anglophone Teachers and Lawyers” Strike Action across the country followed by the start of “armed confrontations” between State and “separatists”.
2019 – Grand National Dialogue, new laws on Decentralization, regional and local councils.
Many, including this commentator would argue that, if half the energy and resources committed to the Grand National Dialogue had characterized pre-Foumban, Foumban and implementing the Foumban Accords, instead of KNDP and "Cameroon Society" intrigues and exclusion of KNC/KPP, perhaps many would have been alive today and the promise of a prosperous, bilingual Cameroon made more beautiful.
Next week, I will use the Southern Cameroons historical context to revisit the "DIMABOLA" caricature as not viewed before, and articulate why a coalition for Cameroon politics may be a bad idea.
Read the sequels to the “The Anglophone Crisis Series: only here on Moneytreeslight. You may wish to support via MoMo +237 653 609 855
Author: Peter Ngembeni MBILE. Peter is a Cameroonian and holds a PhD in Forest Policy and Economics. He is a Sustainable Development Specialist, a Southern Cameroons History Enthusiast and a Political Commentator.
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